introduction On 14 October 2014, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (hereinafter referred as "the Court" or "the IACtHR") rendered its judgment in the Case of Indigenous Communities Kuna of Madungandí and Emberá of Bayano and their Members v. Panama. 1 The applicants complained for the alleged international responsibility of Panama concerning (i) the continuous violation of the right to collective property of the indigenous communities due to the failure to compensate them for the stripping and flooding of their territories, for the construction of a hydroelectric dam from 1972 to 1976; (ii) the lack of recognition, granting deeds and demarcation of lands given to the complainants after the construction of the hydroelectric; (iii) the lack of effective protection of their territory and natural resources from third-parties; (iv) the failure of Panama to provide an adequate and effective remedy allowing access to their property and avoiding interference from third-parties; and (v) the discrimination against the Kuna and Emberá communities by means of certain laws enacted by Panama and which are still in force. 2 In its judgment, the Court by five votes to one, decided to uphold Panama's second preliminary objection concerning its lack of jurisdiction ratione temporis (which specifically referred to claim (i) above) while unanimously dismissing the first and third preliminary objections. 3 As for the merits, the Court unanimously declared that Panama had violated Articles 8.1 (right to a fair trial), 21 (right to property), and 25 (right to judicial protec-tion) in relation to Articles 1.1 and 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights 4 (hereinafter referred as "ACHR"), for three reasons: First, the failure to delimitate, demarcate, and grant deed over lands of the indigenous communities; second, the absence of internal laws before 2008 with regard to delimitation, demarcation and granting deed; and third, the breach of the reasonable time with respect to certain internal proceedings.
In a powerful partial dissenting opinion, Judge Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor Poisot expresses his disagreement with the majority of the Court concerning the decision to uphold Panama's second preliminary objection. 5 Based on said dissenting opinion, this article seeks to analyse the IACtHR's jurisdiction ratione temporis in the context of expropriations and continuous violations of human rights. It will first give an overview of the relevant factual background to the case in section I. In section II, this article will set out the scope of continuous violations under international law, with special emphasis on expropriations. Further, section III will refer to the Court's decision to upheld Panama's preliminary objection and the dissenting opinion appended by Judge Ferrer Mac-Gregor. Lastly, in section IV and as conclusion, this article will provide an analysis with respect to both, the IACtHR's decision and its jurisdiction ratione temporis in the case of expropriations taking place before states have either ratified the ACHR or accepted the contentious jurisdiction of the Court. Likewise, a comment will be made as to the importance of judge Ferrer Mac-Gregor Poisot partial dissenting opinion. From the work made by the ILC for more than four decades, which concluded in the presentation of draft articles to the General Assembly of the United Nations, two provisions deal with the matter of continuous violations. Article 13 establishes an act of a state does not entail the breach of an international obligation unless the state is bound by said obligation when the act occurs.
11 As for Article 14, it defines an instantaneous act as the violation of an international obligation occurring when the act is taking place, although the effects of the breach continue.
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Additionally, when the violation consists of a continuous act, the breach of the international obligations extends over the entire period of time the act extends. In its commentary to these articles, the ILC notes that the determination of when a violation is instantaneous or continuous is to be made on a case by case basis, i.e., in light of the content of the obligation and the circumstances in which the violation occurs.
14 Similarly, it reiterates what is explicitly noted in the wording of draft article 14, namely, that extension in time of the effects of a breach does not have any bearing in the determination whether the act has a continuous character. 15 An example of the situation above is, for the ILC, the act through which an expropriation is carried out. When the said expropriation is direct, it constitutes an instantaneous violation.
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This is so, since the content of the obligation not to expropriate refers as to the prohibition for the state, not to cancel the deed. Once the deed has been revoked, the state has breached its obligation, although the effects continue. As the ILC itself noted, 
B. Investment Arbitral Tribunals
Some arbitral tribunals have analysed its jurisdiction ratione temporis in relation to the continuous violations doctrine. The majority of these tribunals have done it, based on the ILC articles on state responsibility. Their findings in this regard are useful for the subsequent discussion of the case under analysis.
In Mondev International Ltd. v. USA, the arbitral tribunal when assessing an alleged violation of the obligation not to expropriate, concluded it lacked jurisdiction to analyse the merits of this allegation. It considered expropriation as an instantaneous act that, moreover, took place before the treaty entered into force. Compliance or not with the payment of compensation is only relevant therefore for the characterization of the expropriation as either legal or illegal. 18 In accordance thus with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 19 "the mere fact that earlier conduct has gone unremedied or unredressed when a treaty enters into force does not justify a tribunal applying the treaty retrospectively to that conduct." 20 Subsequent arbitral tribunals have consistently applied this reasoning, in order to conclude that they have jurisdiction over events subsequent to the entry into force of the treaty. Nonetheless, and based on the same reasoning, acts such as the lack of payment of certain sums of money deriving from a contract signed before the treaty entered into force, 22 undue delay from internal tribunals in providing justice before and after the treaty entered into force, 23 and the omission to grant concessions and mining permits, 24 have been considered as continuous acts. The reason for characterising these situations as continuous acts (compared to an expropriation) is based on the content of the obligation. In this sense, it is the continuation in time, not only of the effects of the breach but of the breach itself, which makes the act to be considered a continuous violation.
From all the above-mentioned decisions derive the idea (concordant with that expressed by the ILC) that both, the internationally wrongful act and its consequences should occur (even partially) after the treaty has entered into force. Accordingly, in cases concerning the illicit and continuous occupation from the Greek armed forces, 32 the impossibility to access to property located in the northern part of Cyprus during Turkish occupation, 33 and the continuous impossibility to take possession of property and obtain some money from renting it, 34 the ECtHR has considered these situations as continuous violations. All these cases, however, do not refer to limitations to the right to property deriving from a formal act of expropriation (i.e. direct expropriation). On the contrary, they refer to de facto restrictions imposed by the state to the right to property (i.e. indirect expropriation).
In cases concerning direct expropriations, the ECtHR decisions coincide with the views of the ILC, investment tribunals and the HRC, and therefore consider them as instantaneous acts not amounting to a continuous deprivation of the right at hand. 35 In this context, the extinguished European Commission on Human Rights had analysed several complaints regarding expropriations during and after the Second World War. In all of them, the Commission considered it lacked jurisdiction ratione temporis considering, as noted above, the instantaneous nature of these acts. The ECtHR has also confirmed this position, for instance, in the case of Preussische Treuhand GmbH & Co. KG a.A. v. Poland. 37 Interestingly, in the case of Almeida Garret, Mascarenhas Falcão and others v. Portugal, the ECtHR dealt with a situation similar to the one that constitutes the raison d'être of the present article. It referred to the lack of payment, from the Portuguese Government, of compensation provided through a decree enacted after the European Court of Human Rights entered into force. It was noted in this regard that,
While it is true that the Court is not empowered to examine questions linked to the deprivation of the property, such questions clearly being beyond its jurisdiction ratione temporis, the same does not apply to the delays in the assessment and payment of final compensation… the government continued to legislate on the subject after ratifying the Convention.
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Having reviewed how various international courts and tribunals have applied the doctrine of continuous acts in cases of expropriation, the following section will refer the Court's decision to uphold Panama's preliminary objection and the dissenting opinion appended by Judge Ferrer Mac-Gregor.
iii. the courts' decision to uPhoLd PAnAmA's PreLiminAry objection
In the course of the proceedings before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Panama raised the objection ratione temporis to its jurisdiction. It referred as to its lack of jurisdiction to decide on the merits of the claim regarding Panama's international responsibility, for the failure to compensate the indigenous communities for stripping and flooding of their territories due to the construction of a hydroelectric dam from 1972 to 1976. Panama's argument was based on the fact that it ratified the ACHR on 5 June 1978, while accepting the IACtHR's contentious jurisdiction on 9 May 1990. Consequently, it contended that in light of the prohibition to apply treaties retroactively, a manifest lack of jurisdiction exists.
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The Commission decided in its report on the merits not to uphold this objection. Its decision was based on the fact that, the obligations emerging from the expropriation of the indigenous' territories, i.e., compensation and recognition of the rights to the land granted, persist after the entry into force of the ACHR for Panama. This was moreover complemented by subsequent acts from the State reaffirming these obligations.
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A. The Reasoning of the Court
At the beginning of its analysis on the objection, the Court noted that both, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the victims based their argument on the continuous character of the lack of payment of compensation 41 in the Case of the Moiwana Community v. Suriname. 42 The Court therefore noted that, it should determine whether it is competent to assess (a) the alleged lack of payment of compensation agreed a decade before Panama accepted the Court's contentious jurisdiction; and (b) if the amount of compensation is adequate to redress the alleged wrong occasioned by the construction of the hydroelec-tric. Nonetheless, both issues required a previous examination of the continuous character vel non of the lack of payment. 43 In that regard, the Court began by distinguishing the Case of the Moiwana Community v. Suriname from the situation under analysis. It, thus, noted the former referred as to the forced displacement of a tribal community, which had not been replaced in alternative lands. The Court found a violation of Article 21 ACHR (right to property), since the situation of violence deprived them from the use of their traditional lands. 44 On the contrary, the case at hand is based on different facts. The indigenous communities do not have the possibility to return to their traditional lands, were replaced in alternative lands and, the continuous violation was only submitted with regard to the lack of payment and not the deprivation of property. Based on these motives, the Court concluded that the alleged lack of payment of the right to property refers to a disagreement with respect to the payment of compensation acknowledged by Panama in decrees and agreements from 1971, 1976, 1977, and 1980 . All these documents were signed before 1990, i.e. the year in which Panama accepted the IACtHR's contentious jurisdiction. None of them, therefore, are within the jurisdiction ratione temporis of the Court. 48 In consequence, the Court could not proceed to analyse in the merits of the issues related to the flooding of the indigenous communities' territory, namely, the lack of payment of compensation.
B. Judge Ferrer Mac-Gregor partial dissenting opinion
Judge Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor Poisot, voted against the Court's finding regarding its lack of jurisdiction ratione temporis. He thus appended a partial dissenting opinion to the judgment. For him "the Court should have dismissed said preliminary objection raised by the State and proceed to the merits of the dispute, taking into consideration that in the present case we are not before isolated acts of an instant nature, but before a continuous situation (a composite act) concerning the failure to pay compensation."
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In order to sustain his disagreement, Judge Ferrer MacGregor referred to (i) the jurisprudential development of Article 21 from the perspective of the collective property of indigenous communities; (ii) the limitations to the right to collective property of indigenous communities in the Inter-American system; (iii) the right to payment of just compensation in cases of expro- In (iii), Judge Ferrer Mac-Gregor notes that "the Court in its diverse considerations when deciding the preliminary objection with respect to the 'alleged lack of jurisdiction ratione temporis' decided not to enter in the core discussion on the matter, in the sense of defining the meaning and scope of the international standards on what a continuous violation is, and how said standards are applicable to the present case." 50 He, therefore, embarks in an analysis of the doctrine of continuous violations in international law, aiming to assess whether the lack of payment of compensation constitutes a continuous violation.
Throughout (iii), Judge Ferrer Mac-Gregor refers to the ILC's articles on state responsibility, and the jurisprudence of investment tribunals, ECtHR, HRC, and the Court itself.
51 He pays special attention to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR with respect to the right to property in the context of its jurisdiction ratione temporis and from said evaluation he concludes, "the abovementioned cases demonstrate us that the determination on whether an act is continuous, should be done on a case by case basis." 52 Hence, and relying on the facts of the case at hand (and especially the decrees and agreements signed by the government and the indigenous communities), judge Ferrer Mac-Gregor concludes the situation can be considered as a composite act. In The Court has had referred to the scope of its jurisdiction ratione temporis in relation to continuous violations in several opportunities. 61 Nevertheless, in none of these instances an analysis had to be made regarding the failure to pay compensation deriving from an expropriation of property taking place before the ACHR has entered into force for a state and it had accepted the Court's contentious jurisdiction. Consequently, the Case of Indigenous Communities Kuna of Madungandí and Emberá of Bayano and its members v. Panama was a perfect opportunity for the Court set forth the scope of its jurisdiction ratione temporis, in this type of situations.
Expropriation constitutes an instantaneous act under international law, as the jurisprudence of various international courts and tribunals demonstrates. Likewise, the fact that compensation was not granted, does not transform expropriation in a continuous violation. Failure to compensate is but one of the effects of the act of expropriation. It is not relevant thus for the characterisation of the act as either instantaneous or continuous. In that order of ideas, one might conclude that the Court's conclusion as to its jurisdiction ratione temporis in the present case was correct. It did not, however (and as noted by judge Ferrer Mac-Gregor), fully appreciate the facts of the case and did not take into account important decisions from international courts and tribunals 62 that would have led to a different conclusion. It is in this specific regard that the Court's conclusion as to its lack of jurisdiction ratione temporis was incorrect. In two decisions issued by the ECtHR, Portugal (Almeida Garret, Mascarenhas Falcão y and others) 63 and Poland (Broniowski) 64 were found internationally responsible, respectively, for the breach of Article 1 (protection of property) of the Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Both states expropriated property of individuals without providing compensation, before said Protocol entered in force. In spite of this fact, through certain commitments made by these states with regard to compensation after the Protocol's entry into force, the ECtHR concluded to hold jurisdiction and proceed to the merits of the claims.
In the case at hand, three facts deserve special attention. First, from the moment that the expropriation took place, Panama recognised the indigenous communities' right to compensation. 65 Second, in 1980, i.e., after Panama's ratification of the ACHR, an agreement was reached between the indigenous communities and the government with regard to the payment of compensation. 66 Third, and as noted by judge Ferrer Mac-Gregor in his dissenting opinion, Article 21 of the ACHR permits the deprivation of property if inter alia payment of just compensation is made. In light of these three aspects, it is submitted that Panama has unilaterally renewed its commitment to pay compensation, once the ACHR has already entered into force for it. Consequently, Panama should comply with said obligation to pay compensation from the moment it signed the agreement in 1980. Failure to comply with said obligation constitutes a continuous violation over the whole period of time the failure extends. As a result, the Court is competent ratione temporis to assess the merits of the claim.
The fact that Panama did not accept the Court's contentious jurisdiction until 1990 does not affect the previous conclusion. It is true that, in accordance with the non-retroactivity principle, the Court has to consider the date of acceptance by states of its contentious jurisdiction in order to declare their international responsibility.
67 However, it is also true that states are obliged to respect and ensure the rights protected by the ACHR from the date on which it was ratified.
68 Since Panama's breach is of a continuous character and the failure to compensate has extended until present, the Court is competent.
Arriving to this conclusion with regard to the Court's decision (whose correctness is open to be discussed) could not have been possible without an assessment of the doctrine of continuous violations in the context of the jurisdiction ratione temporis of international courts and tribunals. It is in this sense that the dissenting opinion of Judge Ferrer Mac-Gregor is valuable (not in the way he defines the situation, i.e., a composite act) 69 Hence, this is one of the judgments in which a dissenting opinion tends to be more useful than the majority decision. 71 It has clarified certain aspects with regard to the continuous violations doctrine, in the context of expropriation. Similarly, it has implicitly shown how the discussion on the matter took place within the courtroom. Moreover, it has replied to the Court's reasoning and its choice of basing said reasoning in a previous decision with a different factual background and where the title to property was not revoked. In addition, and based on said reply to the IACtHR's reasoning, this partial dissenting opinion has a caution role, in the sense that it can narrow down the scope of the decision in terms of its ratio decidendi, the factual circumstances to which it applies, and the understanding as to how far the legal principle set forth by the Court can be applied in subsequent decisions. Lastly and as already noted, it has taken account of decisions from other international courts and tribunals on the matter; this is something the Court was expected to do in its judgment, considering the ample number of decisions that had dealt with this kind of situation.
In sum, Judge Ferrer Mac-Gregor dissenting opinion leads one to conclude that the Court has missed an important opportunity to set forth the scope of its jurisdiction ratione temporis, with regard to expropriations and the obligations deriving from it for States. Few cases are brought before the Court each year (in addition to not receiving any other on expropriation so far). Hence the IACtHR should have, along with settling the dispute before it, pronounced on issues likely to happen in the region with a view of sending a clear message to states as to how they should act in the context of expropriations.
